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1 Introduction
This paper explores the possibilities of designing mechanisms satisfying properties such as (pairwise) sta-
bility, minimum regret, and forced and forbidden pairs in case of two-sided one-to-one matching problem
(marriage problem).
(Pairwise) stability is a well-known property of a matching. Gale and Shapley (1962) provide an algo-
rithm called men-proposing/women-proposing deferred acceptance (MPDA/WPDA) algorithm that produces a
stable matching at every preference profile. It is well-known that the outcome of the MPDA (WPDA) algo-
rithm is (i) men-maximal (women-maximal), that is, such an outcome maximizes the match of each man
(woman) over all stable matchings, and (ii) women-pessimal (men-pessimal), that is, such an outcome
minimizes the match of each woman (man) over all stable matchings.1
The main motivation of this paper is to provide an algorithmic characterization of all stable matchings
at every preference profile. The other motivation is to provide algorithms to construct stable matchings
with additional desirable properties such as minimum regret and forced/forbidden pairs. The importance
of a characterization of all stable matchings is well-established in the literature. McVitie and Wilson (1971)
provide an iterative procedure to compute all stable matchings for the marriage problem and Martınez
et al. (2004) extend that algorithm to two-sided many-to-many matching problem with substitutable pref-
erences.2 Irving and Leather (1986) provide an alternative method of computing all stable matchings for
the marriage problem by using the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings. To the best of our knowl-
edge, apart from Gale-Shapley algorithm, no direct algorithm that produces stable matching is introduced
to the literature.3 However, as discussed earlier, stable matchings produced by Gale-Shapley algorithm
(Gale and Shapley, 1962) suffer from the problem that they are either extremely biased against men (in
case of WPDA algorithm) or that towards women (in case of MPDA algorithm).
We present a class of algorithms that we call men-women proposing deferred acceptance (MWPDA) algo-
rithms which can produce all stable matchings at every preference profile. Such an algorithm is based on
a given collection of cut-off parameters one for each man. A cut-off parameter κm for a man m is an arbi-
trary integer between 1 and the number of women plus one. For a given collection of cut-off parameters
the algorithm works in a sequence of stages as follows. At the beginning of Stage 1, each man m proposes
each acceptable woman who appears in top κm positions according to his preference, and then WPDA
algorithm is performed with respect to the proposals that the women receive. From a given stage we go
to the subsequent stage if there is a man who (i) has not yet proposed all acceptable women according to
1See Gale and Shapley (1962), McVitie and Wilson (1971), Knuth (1976), and Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2013) for details.
2Kelso Jr and Crawford (1982) are the first to use the substitutability property to show the existence of stable matchings in a
many-to-one model with money.
3McVitie and Wilson (1971) provide a method to compute all stable matchings at a preference profile. However, their method
is lengthy in the sense that every time one needs to produce some particular stable matching, he/she has to start from the
men-maximal (or women-maximal) stable matching and keep on producing all stable matchings that come in the process before
he/she arrives at the intended stable matching. Another problem with this method is that it is not structured enough to produce
stable matching with additional desirable properties.
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his preference, and (ii) is unmatched at that given stage. Moreover, in any stage, if a man m was matched
in the previous stage, then he proposes the same set of women as he did in the previous stage, otherwise
he proposes the remaining set of acceptable women (that is, the acceptable women who do not appear in
top κm positions according to his preference).
Theorem 3.1 of our paper shows that the outcome of an MWPDA algorithm is stable at every preference
profile for any cut-off vector. Theorem 3.2 shows that for any stable matching at a preference profile, there
is a cut-off vector such that the MWPDA algorithm with respect to it will produce that stable matching.
Theorem 3.3 provides a necessary and sufficient condition on the cut-off vectors so that the MWPDA
algorithms with those cut-off vectors will converge at the first stage. We also discuss that these algorithms
can be extended to produce all stable matchings in a two-sided many-to-one matching problem (college
admissions problem) in a way mentioned in Roth and Sotomayor (1989).
The notion of minimum regret under stability is introduced in Knuth (1976). It captures the idea of a
Rawlsian welfare function. The regret of an agent in a matching is defined as the rank of his/her match
according to his/her preference, and the regret of a matching is defined as the highest regret (over all
agents) at that matching. A stable matching satisfies minimum regret stable property at a preference profile
if it has the minimum regret among all the stable matchings at that preference profile.4 Both MPDA and
WPDA algorithms are far from satisfying the minimum regret under stability as their outcomes are either
women-pessimal or men-pessimal. We provide a direct algorithm called the sequential MWPDA algorithm
that produces a minimum regret stable matching at every preference profile.5 We further show that the
outcome of the sequential MWPDA algorithm is women-optimal in the set of all minimum regret stable
matchings.
For practical reasons, sometimes one needs to construct stable matching with additional constraints.
The notion of stable matching with forced pairs is introduced in Knuth (1976), and that with forbidden pairs
is introduced in Dias et al. (2003). To the best of our knowledge, there is no direct algorithm that produces
stable matching with these properties.6 We provide an algorithm called the conditional MWPDA algorithm
that produces stable matching with given sets of forced and forbidden pairs, whenever such a matching
exists. We further show that whenever the conditional MWPDA algorithm produces such a matching,
the outcome is women-optimal in the set of all stable matchings with given sets of forced and forbidden
pairs.
4Note that the regret of an unstable matching can be strictly less than the minimum regret under stability.
5Knuth (1976) provides an algorithm with runtime of the order O(n4) to find a minimum regret stable matching where n is
the number of men, as well as the number of women. The algorithm given in Knuth (1976) is attributed to Alan Selkow. Later,
Gusfield (1987) provide an algorithm that terminates in O(n2) time.
6Knuth (1976) provides an algorithm that produces a stable matching with a given set of forced pairs or reports that none
exists, in O(n2) time, where n is the number of men, as well as the number of women. Later, Gusfield and Irving (1989) provide
an algorithm that terminates in O(|Q1|
2) time, after pre-processing the preference lists in O(n4) time, where Q1 is the set of given
forced pairs. Dias et al. (2003) provide a computer algorithm that produces a stable matching with a given set of forced pairs Q1
and a given set of forbidden pairs Q2 in O((|Q1|+ |Q2|)
2) time, after pre-processing the preference lists in O(n4) time.
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1.1 Organization of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. The marriage problem framework is presented in Section 2. In Section
3, we present MWPDA algorithms and show that they produce all stable matchings at every preference
profile for the marriage problem. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence
of these algorithms at the first stage, and discuss how these algorithms can be used to construct all stable
matchings for the college admissions problem. In Section 4, we present an algorithm that produces a
minimum regret stable matching at every preference profile, and in Section 5, we present an algorithm
that produces a stable matching with given sets of forced and forbidden pairs. All the proofs are collected
in the Appendix.
2 Model
For a finite set A, let L(A) denote the set of all strict linear orders over A.7 An element P of L(A) is called
a preference over A. For a preference P ∈ L(A), let R denote the weak part of P, that is, for all a, b ∈ A,
aRb if and only if
[
aPb or a = b
]
.
For P ∈ L(A) and 1 ≤ k ≤ |A|, we define Tk(P) := {b ∈ A : |{a : aRb}| ≤ k}. So, Tk(P) is the set
of top k elements of A according to P. Moreover, for P ∈ L(A) and a ∈ A, we define rank(P, a) = k if
∣
∣{b ∈ A : bPa}
∣
∣ = k − 1.
We introduce a specialized model of the two-sided matching problem, which will turn out to be suf-
ficiently general to explore the general problem. The simplest two-sided matching problem to model is
the “marriage problem”, which consists of two (finite) sets of agents M = {m1, . . . , mp} and W = {w1,
. . . , wq} (“men” and “women”). Throughout this paper, we assume p, q ≥ 2. We denote by N = M ∪ W.
Each m ∈ M has a preference Pm ∈ L(W ∪ {∅}) and each w ∈ W has a preference Pw ∈ L(M ∪ {∅}). A
man m (woman w) is called acceptable for a woman w (man m) at a preference Pw (Pm) if mPw∅ (wPm∅).
For m ∈ M (w ∈ W), we denote by A(Pm) (A(Pw)) the set of acceptable women (men) for m (w) at a
preference Pm (Pw). By PN = (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , Pw1 , . . . Pwq), we denote a vector of all the agents’ preferences,
which will be referred to as a preference profile.
Definition 2.1. A matching between M and W is a function µ : N → N ∪ {∅} such that
(i) µ(m) ∈ W ∪ {∅} for all m ∈ M,
(ii) µ(w) ∈ M ∪ {∅} for all w ∈ W, and
(iii) µ(m) = w if and only if µ(w) = m.
Definition 2.2. A matching µ : N → N ∪{∅} is individually rational at a preference profile PN if µ(a)Ra∅
for all a ∈ N.
7A strict linear order is a semiconnex, asymmetric, and transitive binary relation.
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Definition 2.3. A pair (m, w) ∈ M × W is called a blocking pair of a matching µ : N → N ∪ {∅} at a
preference profile PN if wPmµ(m) and mPwµ(w).
A matching µ : N → N ∪ {∅} is called pairwise stable at a preference profile PN if it is individually
rational and has no blocking pairs at PN .
Definition 2.4. A coalition N′ ⊆ N is called a blocking coalition of a matching µ : N → N ∪ {∅} at a
preference profile PN if there exists another matching µ
′ : N → N ∪ {∅} such that
(i) µ′(a) ∈ N′ ∪ {∅} for all a ∈ N′, and
(ii) µ′(a)Paµ(a) for all a ∈ N′.
If a matching µ : N → N ∪ {∅} has no blocking coalition at a preference profile PN , then it is called
stable at PN .
Remark 2.1. It is well-known that pairwise stability and stability are equivalent.8 For this reason, we will
say a matching is stable at a preference profile if and only if it is pairwise stable at that preference profile.
We denote by C(PN) the set of all stable matchings at a preference profile PN . It is well-known that
C(PN) 6= ∅ for every preference profile PN (see Gale and Shapley (1962) for details).
Definition 2.5. For a preference profile PN and a set of matchings M, a matching µ ∈ M is women-
optimal in M at PN if µ(w)Rwµ
′(w) for all w ∈ W and all µ′ ∈ M. Similarly, one can define the notion a
men-optimal matching in a set of matchings.9
A matching µ ∈ C(PN) is men-optimal (women-optimal) stable matching at PN if µ is men-optimal
(women-optimal) in C(PN) at PN .
It is well-known that a men-optimal (women-optimal) stable matching exists at every preference pro-
file (see Gale and Shapley (1962) for details).
3 Algorithms for producing all stable matchings at a preference profile
An algorithm is a procedure that produces a matching at any preference profile. In this section, we
provide a class of algorithms, called men-women proposing deferred acceptance (MWPDA) algorithms,
which can produce every stable matching at a preference profile. These algorithms are built on well-
known deferred acceptance (DA) algorithms. For the sake of completeness, we begin with a description
(that is suitable for our purpose) of DA algorithms.
8See Roth and Sotomayor (1992) for details.
9Women-optimal (men-optimal) matching in an arbitrary set of matchings may not exist.
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3.1 Deferred Acceptance algorithm
There are two types of deferred acceptance algorithms: women-proposing deferred acceptance (WPDA)
and men-proposing deferred acceptance (MPDA). In the following, we provide a description of the WPDA
algorithm at a preference profile PN . The same of the MPDA algorithm can be obtained by interchanging
the roles of women and men in the WPDA algorithm.
Step 1. Every woman w proposes her top-ranked acceptable man according to Pw
10. Then, every man m
who has at least one proposal keeps (tentatively) the top acceptable woman according to Pm among these
proposals and rejects the rest. Denote the tentative matching thus obtained by µ1.
Step 2. Every woman w who was rejected in the previous step, proposes the top acceptable man among
those men who have not rejected her in earlier steps. Then, every man m who has at least one proposal,
including any proposal tentatively kept from earlier steps, keeps (tentatively) the top acceptable woman
among these proposals and rejects the rest. Denote the tentative matching thus obtained by µ2.
...
The process is then repeated from Step 2 till a step such that for each woman one of the following two
happens: (i) she has proposed all acceptable men, (ii) she is accepted by some man who is acceptable to
her. At this point, the tentative proposal accepted by a man becomes permanent. Call this the outcome of
the WPDA algorithm at PN .
Remark 3.1. Gale and Shapley (1962) show that at every preference profile PN , there exists a unique men-
optimal stable matching that is produced by the MPDA algorithm and a unique women-optimal stable
matching that is produced by the WPDA algorithm.
Throughout this paper, we denote the men-optimal and the women-optimal stable matching at a pref-
erence profile PN by µM(PN) and µW(PN), respectively. Moreover, whenever the preference profile PN is
clear from the context, we drop it from these notations, that is, we write µM for µM(PN), etc.
Remark 3.2. For all µ ∈ C(PN), µM(m)Rmµ(m)RmµW(m) for all m ∈ M, and µW(w)Rwµ(w)RwµM(w) for
all w ∈ W.11
3.2 MWPDA algorithms
We begin with introducing a piece of notation that will simplify the presentation of our algorithm. For a
preference Pw ∈ L(M ∪ {∅}) and M′ ⊆ M, define PM
′
w as the preference that is obtained by moving the
elements of M′ ∪ {∅} to the top of Pw maintaining their relative ordering. More formally, PM
′
w is such that
10That is, if the top-ranked man of a woman is acceptable, then she proposes him, otherwise she does not propose anybody.
11See Gale and Shapley (1962), McVitie and Wilson (1971), Knuth (1976), and Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2013) for details.
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(i) for all x, y ∈ M′ ∪ {∅}, xPM
′
w y if and only if xPwy, and (ii) for all x ∈ M





An MWPDA algorithm is parameterized by a cut-off vector. A cut-off vector is defined as κ = (κm1 , . . . ,
κmp), where for all m ∈ M, κm ∈ {1, . . . , q + 1} is the cut-off parameter of man m. An MWPDA algorithm
involves a sequence of stages. At the beginning of a stage, say Stage s, each man m proposes a set of
women (which is determined by the parameters). We denote this set by Ws(m). The set of proposals that
each w ∈ W receives in that stage is denoted by Ms(w), that is, Ms(w) = {m : w ∈ Ws(m)}.
Below, we present a detailed description (using the notations introduced above) of the MWPDA algo-
rithm with cut-off vector κ at a preference profile PN .
Stage 1. Take W1(m) = Tκm(Pm) ∩A(Pm) for all m ∈ M. Perform the WPDA algorithm at the preference
profile (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(wq)
wq ). Let µ
1 be the outcome. If W1(m) = A(Pm) for all m ∈ M with
µ1(m) = ∅, then conclude that the algorithm converges and define µ1 as the outcome of the algorithm.
Otherwise, go to Stage 2.















W1(m) if µ1(m) 6= ∅;
A(Pm) \ W1(m) if µ1(m) = ∅ and W1(m) ( A(Pm);
∅ if µ1(m) = ∅ and W1(m) = A(Pm).13
Perform the WPDA algorithm at the preference profile (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M2(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M2(wq)
wq ). Let µ
2 be the
outcome. If W1(m) ∪ W2(m) = A(Pm) for all m ∈ M with µ2(m) = ∅, then conclude that the algorithm
converges and define µ2 as the outcome of the algorithm. Otherwise, go to Stage 3.
























if µ2(m) = ∅ and ∪
s≤2
Ws(m) ( A(Pm);
∅ if µ2(m) = ∅ and ∪
s≤2
Ws(m) = A(Pm).
Perform the WPDA algorithm at the preference profile (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M3(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M3(wq)




Ws(m) = A(Pm) for all m ∈ M with µ3(m) = ∅, then conclude that the algorithm
converges and define µ3 as the outcome of the algorithm. Otherwise, go to Stage 4.
12Note that such a preference PM
′
w may not be unique since it does not specify the relative ranking of the elements of M \ M
′.




We continue this till a stage t∗ such that ∪
s≤t∗
Ws(m) = A(Pm) for all m ∈ M with µt
∗
(m) = ∅. Since
both the number of men and the number of women are finite, such a stage t∗ must exist. At this stage,
define the matching µt
∗
as the outcome the algorithm.
Remark 3.3. If κm = q + 1 for all m ∈ M, then the MWPDA algorithm with κ boils down to the WPDA
algorithm.
We illustrate MWPDA algorithm by means of the following example.
Example 3.1. Let M = {m1, m2, m3, m4, m5} and W = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5}. Consider the preference profile
PN as given below:
Pm1 Pm2 Pm3 Pm4 Pm5 Pw1 Pw2 Pw3 Pw4 Pw5
w1 w1 w2 w1 w1 m2 m4 m5 m2 m3
w2 w3 w1 w2 w2 m5 m5 m2 m3 m1
w3 w2 w3 w5 w3 m1 m2 m4 m1 m5
w4 w4 w4 w4 w4 ∅ m1 m3 m5 ∅
w5 w5 w5 w3 w5 m3 m3 ∅ m4 m2
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ m4 ∅ m1 ∅ m4
Table 3.1: Preference profile for Example 3.1
Let the cut-off vector κ be such that κm1 = 2, κm2 = 4, κm3 = 3, κm4 = 1 and κm5 = 2. The MWPDA
algorithm with κ at the preference profile PN given in Table 3.1 works as follows.
Stage 1. Perform the WPDA algorithm at the preference profile (Pm1 , . . . , Pm5 , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(w5)
w5 ) given
in Table 3.2. The dots in Table 3.2 indicate that all preferences for the corresponding parts are irrelevant
and can be chosen arbitrarily. To emphasize the process at Stage 1, for each man m we have highlighted
the women in Pm in blue that m proposes, and for each woman w we have highlighted the men in Pw in
blue who propose her.
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w1 w1 w2 w1 w1 m2 m4 m5 m2 m3 m2 m5 m2 m2 ∅
w2 w3 w1 w2 w2 m5 m5 m2 m3 m1 m5 m2 m3 ∅
...
w3 w2 w3 w5 w3 m1 m2 m4 m1 m5 m1 m1 ∅
...
w4 w4 w4 w4 w4 ∅ m1 m3 m5 ∅ ∅ m3
...
w5 w5 w5 w3 w5 m3 m3 ∅ m4 m2 m3 ∅
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ m4 ∅ m1 ∅ m4 m4
...
Table 3.2: Updated preference profile at Stage 1
The outcome of the WPDA algorithm at Stage 1 is [(m1, ∅), (m2, w1), (m3, w3), (m4, ∅), (m5, w2)]. Since
µ1(m1) = ∅ with W
1(m1) ( A(Pm1), we go to Stage 2.
Stage 2. Perform the WPDA algorithm at the preference profile (Pm1 , . . . , Pm5 , P
M2(w1)















w1 w1 w2 w1 w1 m2 m4 m5 m2 m3 m2 m4 m2 m2 m1
w2 w3 w1 w2 w2 m5 m5 m2 m3 m1 m5 m5 m4 m1 ∅
w3 w2 w3 w5 w3 m1 m2 m4 m1 m5 ∅ m2 m3 m4 m4
w4 w4 w4 w4 w4 ∅ m1 m3 m5 ∅ m3 m3 ∅ ∅
...
w5 w5 w5 w3 w5 m3 m3 ∅ m4 m2
... ∅ m1
...
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ m4 ∅ m1 ∅ m4
...
...
Table 3.3: Updated preference profile at Stage 2
The outcome of the WPDA algorithm at Stage 2 is [(m1, w4), (m2, w1), (m3, w3), (m4, w2), (m5, ∅)]. Since
µ2(m5) = ∅ with W1(m5) ∪ W2(m5) ( A(Pm5), we go to Stage 3.
Stage 3. Perform the WPDA algorithm at the preference profile (Pm1 , . . . , Pm5 , P
M3(w1)
















w1 w1 w2 w1 w1 m2 m4 m5 m2 m3 m2 m4 m5 m2 m1
w2 w3 w1 w2 w2 m5 m5 m2 m3 m1 ∅ m2 m2 m1 m5
w3 w2 w3 w5 w3 m1 m2 m4 m1 m5 m3 m3 m4 m5 ∅
w4 w4 w4 w4 w4 ∅ m1 m3 m5 ∅
... ∅ m3 m4 m4
w5 w5 w5 w3 w5 m3 m3 ∅ m4 m2
... ∅ ∅
...
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ m4 ∅ m1 ∅ m4 m1
...
Table 3.4: Updated preference profile at Stage 3
The outcome of the WPDA algorithm at Stage 3 is [(m1, w4), (m2, w1), (m3, ∅), (m4, w2), (m5, w3)]. Since
µ3(m3) = ∅ with W1(m3) ∪ W2(m3) ∪ W3(m3) ( A(Pm3), we go to Stage 4.
Stage 4. Perform the WPDA algorithm at the preference profile (Pm1 , . . . , Pm5 , P
M4(w1)















w1 w1 w2 w1 w1 m2 m4 m5 m2 m3 m2 m4 m5 m2 m3
w2 w3 w1 w2 w2 m5 m5 m2 m3 m1 ∅ m2 m2 m3 m1
w3 w2 w3 w5 w3 m1 m2 m4 m1 m5
... ∅ m4 m1 m5
w4 w4 w4 w4 w4 ∅ m1 m3 m5 ∅
... ∅ m5 ∅
w5 w5 w5 w3 w5 m3 m3 ∅ m4 m2 m1 m4 m4
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ m4 ∅ m1 ∅ m4
... ∅
...
Table 3.5: Updated preference profile at Stage 4
The outcome of the WPDA algorithm at Stage 4 is [(m1, w5), (m2, w1), (m3, w4), (m4, w2), (m5, w3)]. Since
µ4(m) 6= ∅ for all m ∈ M, the outcome of MWPDA algorithm with the cut-off vector κ is [(m1, w5), (m2,
w1), (m3, w4), (m4, w2), (m5, w3)].
3.3 MWPDA algorithms produce all stable matchings
In this subsection, we explore the stability of the outcome of an MWPDA algorithm. We also provide a
sufficient condition on an MWPDA algorithm to produce a specific stable matching at the first step of
the WPDA algorithm at Stage 1 of the mentioned MWPDA algorithm. Our next theorem shows that the
outcome of an MWPDA algorithm at any preference profile and with any cut-off vector is stable.
Theorem 3.1. For every preference profile PN and every cut-off vector κ, the MWPDA algorithm with κ produces
a stable matching at PN .
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The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix A; here we provide the idea of it. By Observation
A.1, the match of each man (weakly) improves (according to his preference) over the steps of the WPDA
algorithm at any given stage. Next, we show the match of each woman (weakly) improves over the stages
(Lemma A.1). Finally, we combine these two facts to prove Theorem 3.1.
Now, we present the main result of this section. It says that every stable matching at any preference
profile can be produced by an MWPDA algorithm with some cut-off vector. However, we prove a stronger
version of this, which says that every stable matching at a preference profile can be produced at the first
step of the WPDA algorithm at Stage 1 of an MWPDA algorithm by using a suitable cut-off vector.
Theorem 3.2. Let PN be a preference profile and let µ ∈ C(PN). Suppose the cut-off vector κ is such that κm =
rank(Pm, µ(m)) for all m ∈ M. Then, the MWPDA algorithm with cut-off vector κ produces µ at PN . Furthermore,
µ is produced at the first step of the WPDA algorithm at Stage 1 (of the mentioned MWPDA algorithm).
The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix B.2. It is worth mentioning that the cut-off vector
κ defined in Theorem 3.2 is not the unique cut-off vector that produces µ at the first step of the WPDA
algorithm at Stage 1.
In view of Theorem 3.2, one may think that if every stable matching can be produced at the first step
of the WPDA algorithm at Stage 1 of an MWPDA algorithm, then why do we need a sequence of stages
and a sequence of steps of the WPDA algorithm at each stage? The answer to this question is as follows.
As it is evident from Theorem 3.2, the ‘suitable‘ cut-off vector for a given stable matching that produces
it at the first step of the WPDA algorithm at the first stage cannot be identified without using complete
knowledge of that stable matching. Thus, in order to find all stable matchings at a preference profile, one
needs to use MWPDA algorithm with arbitrary cut-off vectors (and consequently needs to go through
several stages).
3.4 Convergence of MWPDA algorithms at the first stage
In this subsection, we discuss the convergence of an MWPDA algorithm. As we have mentioned in
Subsection 3.3, for every stable matching there exists a cut-off vector so that the MWPDA algorithm with
that converges at the first step of the WPDA algorithm at Stage 1 producing the stable matching. However,
identifying such a cut-off vector requires complete knowledge of the stable matching. In view of this, we
provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the cut-off vectors so that the MWPDA algorithms with
those cut-off vectors converge at the first stage.
Recall that, we denote the men-optimal stable matching at a preference profile PN by µM(PN). More-
over, whenever the preference profile PN is clear from the context, we drop it from this notation, that is,
we write µM for µM(PN).
Theorem 3.3. Let PN be a preference profile. The MWPDA algorithm with a cut-off vector κ at PN converges at







for all m ∈ M.
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The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix B.1.







for all m ∈ M does
not guarantee the convergence of the MWPDA algorithm at the first step of the WPDA algorithm at the
first stage, it might take several steps to converge.
3.5 Application to the college admissions problem
The “college admissions problem” is a many-to-one generalization of the marriage problem.14 Every
(many-to-one) stable matching in the college admissions problem where colleges’ preferences satisfy re-
sponsiveness can be obtained from Theorem 3.2 in the following way.15
(i) Construct a marriage problem for the given college admissions problem (see Roth (1985) and Roth
and Sotomayor (1989) for details on how to construct a related marriage problem).
(ii) Apply MWPDA algorithms to obtain all (one-to-one) stable matchings of the marriage problem.
(iii) Transform all (one-to-one) stable matchings of the marriage problem to their many-to-one versions
by using a transformation as defined in Roth and Sotomayor (1989).
It follows from Lemma 1 in Roth and Sotomayor (1989) that the many-to-one matchings of the college
admissions problem constructed in this manner will be the only pairwise stable matchings, and from
Proposition 1 in Roth and Sotomayor (1989), that they will also be the only stable matchings.
4 A minimum regret stable algorithm
In this section, we present an algorithm which produces a stable matching at every preference profile
with an additional desirable property, namely minimum regret. As we have mentioned in Remark 3.1,
the outcome of the WPDA algorithm is women-optimal stable matching and that of the MPDA algorithm
is men-optimal stable matching. In other words, both these algorithms are extremely biased.16 However,
as the following example demonstrates, MWPDA algorithms with suitable cut-off vectors can produce
stable matchings that are not so biased.
Example 4.1. Let M = {m1, m2, m3} and W = {w1, w2, w3}. Consider the preference profile PN given in
Table 4.1.
14See Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2013) for a formal description of the college admissions problem.
15The notion of responsiveness is due to Roth (1985), see Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2013) for a formal definition of the
same.
16See Remark 3.2 for details.
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Pm1 Pm2 Pm3 Pw1 Pw2 Pw3
w1 w2 w3 m2 m3 m1
w2 w3 w1 m3 m1 m2
w3 w1 w2 m1 m2 m3
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Table 4.1: Preference profile for Example 4.1
The outcome of the MPDA algorithm at PN is
µM = [(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3)],
and that of the WPDA algorithm is
µW = [(m1, w3), (m2, w1), (m3, w2)].
However, the outcome of the MWPDA algorithm with κ = (2, 2, 2) is
µ = [(m1, w2), (m2, w3), (m3, w1)].
Note that in µM, each man gets his best choice whereas each woman gets her worst, and conversely,
in µW , each woman gets her best choice whereas each man gets his worst. However, in µ, all men and
women get their second-best choices.
In view of this example, we define the notion of minimum regret under stability. This notion is introduced
in Knuth (1976) as a desirable property of a matching.
Definition 4.1. Let PN be a preference profile and let µ be a matching at PN . Then, the regret of µ at PN is
defined as α(µ, PN) = max
a∈N
rank(Pa, µ(a)).
The minimum regret under stability at PN is defined as α(PN) = min
µ∈C(PN)
α(µ, PN).
It is worth mentioning that the regret of an unstable matching can be strictly less than the minimum
regret under stability.
Definition 4.2. (Knuth, 1976) A matching µ∗ is minimum regret stable at a preference profile PN if it is
stable at PN and its regret is same as minimum regret under stability at PN , that is, α(µ
∗, PN) = α(PN).
An algorithm is called minimum regret stable if it produces a minimum regret stable matching at every
preference profile.
It is worth noting that the minimum regret property has a close resemblance with a Rawlsian welfare
function. Roughly speaking, this property tries to improve the outcome of the ‘poorest of the poor’ agent.
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Clearly, both WPDA and MPDA algorithms do not satisfy this property in general since these algorithms
always maximize the matches of one side of the market (women or men), and consequently maximizes
the regret of the other side. For instance, consider Example 4.1. The regret of the both outcomes of the
WPDA and MPDA algorithms is 3. However, the same of the outcome of the MWPDA algorithm with
κ = (2, 2, 2) is 2.
4.1 Sequential MWPDA algorithm
In this subsection, we present an algorithm that is minimum regret stable. We call this the sequential
MWPDA algorithm. It involves a sequence of rounds. At every round, it performs an MWPDA algorithm
with a cut-off vector. Below, we present a formal description of this algorithm at a preference profile PN .
Let κ∗ = max
m∈M
rank(Pm, µM(m)).
Round 1. Perform the MWPDA algorithm with κ such that κm = κ∗ for all m ∈ M. Let µ∗1 be the outcome
of the MWPDA algorithm at Round 1. If rank(Pm, ∅) ≤ κ∗ for all m ∈ M or rank(Pw, µ∗1(w)) ≤ κ
∗ for
all w ∈ W, then conclude that the algorithm converges and define µ∗1 as the outcome of the sequential
MWPDA algorithm. Else, go to Round 2.
Round 2. Perform the MWPDA algorithm with κ such that κm = κ∗ + 1 for all m ∈ M. Let µ∗2 be the
outcome of the MWPDA algorithm at Round 2. If rank(Pm, ∅) ≤ κ∗ + 1 for all m ∈ M or rank(Pw,
µ∗2(w)) ≤ κ
∗ + 1 for all w ∈ W, then conclude that the algorithm converges and define µ∗2 as the outcome
of the sequential MWPDA algorithm. Else, go to Round 3.
...
Continue this till a round k such that either we have rank(Pm, ∅) ≤ κ∗ + k − 1 for all m ∈ M or rank(Pw,
µ∗k (w)) ≤ κ
∗ + k− 1 for all w ∈ W for the first time at Round k.17 In other words, k is such that for all round
l < k, there exists m ∈ M with rank(Pm, ∅) > κ∗ + l − 1 and w ∈ W with rank(Pw, µ∗l (w)) > κ
∗ + l − 1.
Define µ∗k as the outcome of the sequential MWPDA algorithm.
Remark 4.1. It is worth noting that in order to execute the sequential MWPDA algorithm at a preference
profile PN , first one needs to compute the men-optimal stable matching at PN .
Remark 4.2. By Theorem 3.3, the MWPDA algorithm used at every round of the sequential MWPDA
algorithm converges at Stage 1. This ensures quick convergence of the sequential MWPDA algorithm.
Our next result says that the sequential MWPDA algorithm produces the women-optimal matching in
the set of all minimum regret stable matchings.
17Since κm cannot be bigger than q + 1, such a round must exist.
14
Theorem 4.1. The sequential MWPDA algorithm is minimum regret stable. Furthermore, the outcome of the
sequential MWPDA algorithm is women-optimal in the set of all minimum regret stable matchings.
The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix C.
5 Stable matching with forced and forbidden pairs
The notion of stable matching with forced pairs is introduced in Knuth (1976), and that with forbidden pairs
is introduced in Dias et al. (2003). In this section, we provide an algorithm that produces stable matching
with forced and forbidden pairs, whenever such a matching exists.
Definition 5.1. Given a set of pairs Q1 ⊆ M × W, we say a matching µ is with forced pairs Q1 if every
pair in Q1 is matched in µ, that is, µ(m) = w for all (m, w) ∈ Q1.
Definition 5.2. Given a set of pairs Q2 ⊆ M × W, we say a matching µ is with forbidden pairs Q2 if no
pair in Q2 is matched in µ, that is, µ(m) 6= w for all (m, w) ∈ Q2.
5.1 Conditional MWPDA algorithm
Consider a preference profile PN and let Q1 be a set of forced pairs and Q2 be a set of forbidden pairs.
Note that for all (m, w), (m′, w′) ∈ Q1 with (m, w) 6= (m
′, w′), we have m 6= m′ and w 6= w′.18 For m ∈ M,
with slight abuse of notation, we say m ∈ Q1, if there exists w ∈ W such that (m, w) ∈ Q1.
In what follows, we present an algorithm, called conditional MWPDA algorithm given (Q1, Q2), that
produces a stable matching with forced pairs Q1 and forbidden pairs Q2, whenever such a matching
exists. The algorithm involves a sequence of rounds. At every round, an MWPDA algorithm is performed
with a cut-vector κ such that κm = rank(Pm, w) for all m ∈ Q1 with (m, w) ∈ Q1. The cut-off parameters
for other men may change over rounds; they are defined at the beginning of each round of the conditional
MWPDA algorithm.
Round 1. Define κ1 such that for all m /∈ Q1, κ
1
m = rank(Pm, ∅). Perform the MWPDA algorithm with κ
1.
Let µ∗1 be the outcome of the MWPDA algorithm at Round 1.
(i) If µ∗1 is with forced pairs Q1 and forbidden pairs Q2, then conclude that the algorithm converges
and define µ∗1 as the outcome of the algorithm.
(ii) Else, if there exists a pair (m, w) ∈ Q1 such that µ
∗
1(m) 6= w, then conclude that the algorithm STOPS.
(iii) Else, go to Round 2.
18Otherwise there will be no stable matching with forced pairs Q1.
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rank(Pm, µ∗1(m)) if (m, µ
∗
1(m)) /∈ Q2;
rank(Pm, µ∗1(m))− 1 if (m, µ
∗
1(m)) ∈ Q2.
Perform the MWPDA algorithm with κ2. Let µ∗2 be the outcome of the MWPDA algorithm at Round 2.
(i) If µ∗2 is with forced pairs Q1 and forbidden pairs Q2, then conclude that the algorithm converges
and define µ∗2 as the outcome of the algorithm.
(ii) Else, if there exists a pair (m, w) ∈ Q1 such that µ
∗
2(m) 6= w or if there exists m ∈ M such that
rank(Pm, µ∗2(m)) > κ
2
m, then conclude that the algorithm STOPS.
(iii) Else, go to Round 3.
...




m , and for




m . Therefore, if the algorithm does not converge or STOP at any
round, then there will come a round r where some m /∈ Q1 will have κ
r
m = 0. In that case too, conclude
that the algorithm STOPS.
5.2 Conditional MWPDA algorithm produces stable matching with forced and forbidden
pairs
The following result says that a stable matching with given forced and forbidden pairs exists at a prefer-
ence profile only if the conditional MWPDA algorithm converges at that preference profile. It further says
that whenever the conditional MWPDA algorithm converges, it produces a stable matching with given
forced and forbidden pairs, which is also women-optimal in the set of all stable matchings with the given
forced and forbidden pairs. Thus, if at a preference profile, the conditional MWPDA algorithm STOPS at
any round, then it must be that there is no stable matching with the corresponding forced and forbidden
pairs at that preference profile.
Theorem 5.1. A stable matching with forced pairs Q1 and forbidden pairs Q2 exists at a preference profile PN if
and only if the conditional MWPDA algorithm given (Q1, Q2) converges at PN . Further, whenever this algorithm
converges, the outcome is women-optimal in the set of all stable matchings with forced pairs Q1 and forbidden pairs
Q2.
The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix D.
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By the construction of the conditional MWPDA algorithm, we obtain the following corollary from
Theorem 5.1. It says that whenever there is no forbidden pair, the conditional MWPDA algorithm will
come to a conclusion at the first round itself: either it will converge or it will STOP. If it converges at this
round, then a stable matching with given forced pairs is produced as the outcome which is also women-
optimal in the set of all such stable matchings. If it STOPS, then that means there is no such a stable
matching.
Corollary 5.1. Let PN be a preference profile and let Q1 be a set of forced pairs.
(i) If there exists a stable matching with forced pairs Q1 at PN , then the conditional MWPDA algorithm given
(Q1, ∅) at PN converges at Round 1. Furthermore, the outcome is women-optimal in the set of all stable
matchings with forced pairs Q1.
(ii) If there is no stable matching with forced pairs Q1 at PN , then the conditional MWPDA algorithm given
(Q1, ∅) at PN STOPS at Round 1.
Appendix A Proof of Theorem 3.1
In all our proofs, for a given MWPDA algorithm at a preference profile PN , we use the notation µ
s
k to
denote the outcome obtained at Step k of the WPDA algorithm at Stage s of the given MWPDA algorithm,
and the notation t∗ to denote the last stage of the MWPDA algorithm. We make two observations which
we will use in our proofs.
Observation A.1. Consider a stage, say s, and two steps l and k with l ≤ k of the WPDA algorithm at Stage s of
an MWPDA algorithm at a preference profile PN . Then, it follows from the property of the WPDA algorithm that
for all m ∈ M, we have µsk(m)Rmµ
s
l (m).
Observation A.2. Consider a stage, say s, of an MWPDA algorithm at a preference profile PN . It follows from the
property of the WPDA algorithm that µs is stable at the preference profile (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
Ms(w1)




Fix a preference profile PN . Take an arbitrary cut-off vector κ and consider the MWPDA algorithm
with κ at PN . First, we prove a lemma that says that the match of a woman gets better over stages.
Lemma A.1. For all r ≤ s ≤ t∗ and all w ∈ W, µs(w)Rwµr(w).
Proof of Lemma A.1. By the definition of the MWPDA algorithm, we have µs(w)R
Ms(w)
w ∅ for all w ∈ W.
This, together with the construction of Ms(w), implies that µs(w)Rw∅ for all w ∈ W. So, if µr(w) = ∅ for
some w ∈ W, then there is nothing to show for that w. Take w ∈ W such that µr(w) = m ∈ M and take
r < t∗. It is enough to show that µr+1(w)Rwµr(w). Assume for contradiction that mPwµr+1(w).




Because µr(m) = w, by the definition of the MWPDA algorithm, we have Wr(m) = Wr+1(m) and
w ∈ Wr(m). Combining all these, we have w ∈ Wr+1(m), which implies m ∈ Mr+1(w). Since mPwµr+1(w)
and m ∈ Mr+1(w), we have mP
Mr+1(w)
w µ
r+1(w). By the definition of the MWPDA algorithm, there must
be some step l of the WPDA algorithm at Stage r + 1 where m rejects w to be tentatively matched with





Moreover, since w′ ∈ Wr+1(m) and Wr(m) = Wr+1(m), we have w′ ∈ Wr(m).
Assume that Step l of the WPDA algorithm at Stage r + 1 has the property that there is no ŵ ∈ W with
µr(ŵ) 6= ∅ and µr(ŵ)Pŵµr+1(ŵ) such that man µr(ŵ) rejects woman ŵ at some step l′ < l of the WPDA
algorithm at Stage r + 1. This is without loss of generality because, if there is such woman ŵ, then we can
take w = ŵ.
Suppose mPw′µ
r(w′). Because w′ ∈ Wr(m), we have m ∈ Mr(w′). Since mPw′µ
r(w′) and m ∈ Mr(w′),





r(w′). This, together with (A.1a) and the fact
µr(m) = w, implies that (m, w′) blocks µr at (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
Mr(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
Mr(wq)
wq ), which is a contradiction
to Observation A.2. So, it must be that µr(w′)Rw′m. Because µ
r(w) = m, w 6= w′, and µr(w′)Rw′m, we have
µr(w′)Pw′m. Moreover, it follows from (A.1b) and the construction of P
Mr+1(w′)
w′ that mPw′∅. Combining
the facts that µr(w′)Pw′m and mPw′∅, we have
µ
r(w′)Pw′mPw′∅. (A.2)
Now, we complete the proof of the lemma. Because w′ ∈ Wr+1(m), we have m ∈ Mr+1(w′). Fur-
thermore, (A.2) implies µr(w′) ∈ M. This, together with the definition of the MWPDA algorithm, yields





This, together with the fact that woman w′ is tentatively matched with man m at Step l of the WPDA
algorithm at Stage r + 1, implies that µr(w′) rejects w′ at some step l′ < l of the WPDA algorithm at Stage
r + 1. However, this contradicts our assumption on Step l of the WPDA algorithm at Stage r + 1, which
completes the proof of Lemma A.1. 
Completion of the proof of Theorem 3.1. In view of Remark 2.1, we show that the outcome of the MWPDA
algorithm is pairwise stable. Note that by the definition of the MWPDA algorithm, its outcome is always
individually rational. We show that no pair can block its outcome. Let µ be the outcome of the MWPDA
algorithm. Assume for contradiction that a pair (m, w) ∈ M × W blocks µ at PN .
Since µ is individually rational at PN and (m, w) is a blocking pair of µ at PN , we have wPmµ(m)Rm∅
and mPwµ(w)Rw∅. Because wPmµ(m), there must be some stage, say r∗, at which m proposes w for the
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first time. If µr
∗
(w)Rwm, then by Lemma A.1, we have µ(w)Rwm, which contradicts the fact mPwµ(w)Rw∅.
So, assume mPwµ




(w), w proposes m and gets rejected at some step,
say l, of the WPDA algorithm at Stage r∗. Since wPm∅, by Observation A.1, this means
µ
r∗(m)PmwPm∅. (A.3)
If r∗ = t∗, then (A.3) implies µ(m)Pmw, which contradicts the fact wPmµ(m)Rm∅. So, assume r∗ < t∗.
By (A.3), we have µr
∗
(m) 6= ∅. Since r∗ < t∗ and µr
∗
(m) 6= ∅, m proposes the women in Wr
∗
(m) at
the beginning of Stage r∗ + 1. Then, using a similar argument as for the derivation of (A.3), we have
µr
∗+1(m)PmwPm∅. Continuing in this manner, it follows that µ(m)PmwPm∅, which contradicts the fact
wPmµ(m)Rm∅. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1. 
Appendix B Proofs of Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3
In this section, we prove Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3. We prove Theorem 3.3 first since we use that in
the proof of Theorem 3.2.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3
We prove Theorem 3.3 using the following lemmas. Our first lemma is taken from McVitie and Wilson
(1970). It says that the set of unmatched men or women stays the same in all stable matchings.
Lemma B.1. (McVitie and Wilson, 1970) Let PN be a preference profile and let µ, µ
′ ∈ C(PN). Then, for all a ∈ N,
µ(a) = ∅ implies µ′(a) = ∅.
Our next lemma provides a sufficient condition on κ such that a given stable matching at a preference
profile PN remains stable at (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(wq)
wq ).
Lemma B.2. Let PN be a preference profile and let µ ∈ C(PN). Then, µ is stable at (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . ,
P
M1(wq)







for all m ∈ M.







for all m ∈ M. In view
of Remark 2.1, we show that µ is pairwise stable at (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(wq)
wq ). First note that







for all m ∈ M, we have µ(w) ∈ M1(w) ∪ {∅} for
all w ∈ W. Moreover, since µ(w) ∈ M1(w) ∪ {∅} for all w ∈ W, we have for all w ∈ W and all m ∈ M,
mR
M1(w)
w µ(w) implies mRwµ(w). Further note that the preferences of the men are unchanged from PN
to (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(wq)
wq ). Therefore, if (m, w) blocks µ at (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(wq)
wq ),
then they also block µ at PN contradicting the fact that µ is stable at PN . Hence, µ cannot have a blocking
pair at (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(wq)
wq ). Using a similar logic, it follows that µ is individually rational
at (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)













for all m ∈ M. We show the MWPDA algorithm with κ at PN converges at
Stage 1. By the definition of the algorithm, it converges at Stage 1 if W1(m) = A(Pm) for all m ∈ M with
µ1(m) = ∅. Take m ∈ M. If µM(m) = ∅, then by the definition of κ, m proposes all acceptable women
at the beginning of Stage 1, and hence W1(m) = A(Pm). Suppose µM(m) 6= ∅. It is enough to show







for all m ∈ M, by Lemma
B.2, µM is stable at (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(wq)
wq ). Furthermore, by Observation A.2, µ
1 is stable at
(Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(wq)
wq ). Since µ
1 and µM both are stable at (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(wq)
wq ),
by Lemma B.1, we have µ1(m) 6= ∅.
















, this means µ1(m) 6= ∅ and rank(Pm, µ1(m)) ≤ κm.








have rank(Pm, µ1(m)) < rank(Pm, µM(m)). This, along with Remark 3.2, implies µ
1 is not stable at PN ,
which contradicts Theorem 3.1. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3. 
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let µM be the men-optimal stable matching at PN . Because µ ∈ C(PN), by Remark
3.2, we have rank(Pm, µ(m)) ≥ rank(Pm, µM(m)) for all m ∈ M. This, together with the fact that κm =







for all m ∈ M.
Therefore, by Theorem 3.3, the MWPDA algorithm with κ converges at Stage 1.








for all m ∈ M. This, together with Lemma B.2, implies that µ is stable at (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp ,
P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(wq)
wq ). Moreover, by the definition of the MWPDA algorithm, µ
1 is women-optimal stable
matching at (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(wq)
wq ). Since µ ∈ C(Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(wq)
wq ) and µ
1 is
women-optimal stable matching at (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(wq)
wq ), by Remark 3.2, it follows that
µ(m)Rmµ
1(m) for all m ∈ M. (B.1)
Since µ, µ1 ∈ C(Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(wq)
wq ), by Lemma B.1, we have
µ
1(m) = µ(m) for all m ∈ M with µ1(m) = ∅. (B.2)
By the definition of the MWPDA algorithm, rank(Pm, µ1(m)) ≤ κm for all m ∈ M with µ1(m) 6= ∅. This,
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together with definition of κ and (B.1), implies that
µ
1(m) = µ(m) for all m ∈ M with µ1(m) 6= ∅. (B.3)
(B.2) and (B.3) together imply µ1 = µ.
It remains to show that the MWPDA algorithm with κ converges at the first step of the WPDA algo-
rithm at Stage 1. Suppose not. Then, there exists a pair (m, w) such that at the first step of the WPDA
algorithm at Stage 1, w proposes m and gets rejected. By the definition of the MWPDA algorithm, this
means w ∈ W1(m) and mP
M1(w)
w µ
1(w). Moreover, since µ1 = µ and mP
M1(w)
w µ
1(w), we have µ(m) 6= w.
The facts κm = rank(Pm, µ(m)), w ∈ W1(m), and w 6= µ(m) together imply wPmµ(m). Because µ1 = µ,
this, together with the fact mP
M1(w)
w µ
1(w), implies (m, w) blocks µ1 at (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(wq)
wq ),
a contradiction to Observation A.2. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.2. 
Appendix C Proof of Theorem 4.1
We prove a sequence of lemmas that we use in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Lemma C.1. Let PN be a preference profile and let κ be such that κm ≥ rank(Pm, µM(m)) for all m ∈ M. Suppose
µ is the outcome of the MWPDA algorithm with κ at PN . Then, rank(Pm, µ(m)) ≤ κm for all m ∈ M.
Proof of Lemma C.1. By Theorem 3.1, µ ∈ C(PN). Since µ, µM ∈ C(PN), by Lemma B.1, we have µ(m) =
µM(m) for all m ∈ M with µ(m) = ∅. This, together with the definition of κ, implies
rank(Pm, µ(m)) ≤ κm for all m ∈ M with µ(m) = ∅. (C.1)







for all m ∈ M. Therefore,
by Theorem 3.3, the MWPDA algorithm with κ at PN converges at Stage 1 producing µ. This, together
with the definition of the MWPDA algorithm, implies
rank(Pm, µ(m)) ≤ κm for all m ∈ M with µ(m) 6= ∅. (C.2)
The proof of Lemma C.1 follows from (C.1) and (C.2). 
The implication of our next lemma is as follows. Let µ be the outcome of the MWPDA algorithm with
cut-off vector κ where κ is such that every man gets to propose the woman (together with other women)
who he would be matched with in the men-optimal stable matching (if a man is unmatched in the men-
optimal stable matching, then he proposes all acceptable women). Let µ′ be another stable matching
where the rank of the match of every man m (the match might be some woman or ∅) according to Pm is
less than or equal to κm. Then, for every woman, the match in µ must be at least as good as that in µ
′.
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Lemma C.2. Let PN be a preference profile and let κ be such that κm ≥ rank(Pm, µM(m)) for all m ∈ M. Let µ be
the outcome of the MWPDA algorithm with κ at PN . Suppose µ
′ ∈ C(PN) is such that rank(Pm, µ
′(m)) ≤ κm for
all m ∈ M. Then, µ(w)Rwµ′(w) for all w ∈ W.
Proof of Lemma C.2. Suppose µ and µ′ are as defined in Lemma C.2. Since κm ≥ rank(Pm, µM(m))







for all m ∈ M. This, along
with Theorem 3.3, implies that the MWPDA algorithm with κ at PN converges at Stage 1 producing µ.
By Observation A.2, this means µ is stable at (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(wq)
wq ). Also, since rank(Pm,







for all m ∈ M.
This, along with Lemma B.2, implies that µ′ is stable at (Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(wq)
wq ). Because µ,
µ′ ∈ C(Pm1 , . . . , Pmp , P
M1(w1)
w1 , . . . , P
M1(wq)
wq ) and µ is the outcome of the WPDA algorithm at Stage 1 of
the MWPDA algorithm, by Remark 3.2, we have µ(w)R
M1(w)
w µ
′(w) for all w ∈ W. By the definition
of the MWPDA algorithm, µ(w) ∈ M1(w) ∪ {∅}. As rank(Pm, µ′(m)) ≤ κm for all m ∈ M, we have




′(w), by the construction of P
M1(w)
w , we have µ(w)Rwµ
′(w) for all w ∈ W. This completes the
proof of Lemma C.2. 
Completion of the proof of Theorem 4.1. By Theorem 3.1, it is straightforward that the sequential MWPDA
algorithm is stable. We proceed to show that the sequential MWPDA algorithm produces a minimum
regret stable matching at every preference profile. Take a preference profile PN . Let κ be the cut-off vector
that is used at the terminal round of the sequential MWPDA algorithm at PN and µ be the outcome of the
sequential MWPDA algorithm at PN . It follows from the definition of the sequential MWPDA algorithm
that κm ≥ rank(Pm, µM(m)) for all m ∈ M. Therefore, by Lemma C.1 along with the definition of the
sequential MWPDA algorithm, we have
rank(Pm, µ(m)) ≤ κm for all m ∈ M. (C.3)
Claim C.1. κm ≤ α(PN) for all m ∈ M.
Proof of Claim C.1. Assume for contradiction that κm > α(PN) for some (and hence, all) m ∈ M. Consider
the round of the sequential MWPDA algorithm where the MWPDA algorithm is performed with κ̂ where
κ̂m = α(PN) for all m ∈ M. Let µ̂ be the outcome of that round. By the definition of α(PN), there must exist
µ′ ∈ C(PN) such that α(µ
′, PN) = α(PN). Because α(µ
′, PN) = α(PN), we have rank(Pm, µ
′(m)) ≤ α(PN)





rank(Pw, µ′(w)) ≤ α(PN). By the definition of the sequential MWPDA algorithm, this means that
the algorithm cannot go for another round, which contradicts the fact that κm > α(PN) for all m ∈ M.
This completes the proof of Claim C.1. 
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Since κ is the cut-off vector that is used at the terminal round of the sequential MWPDA algorithm at
PN and µ is the outcome of the sequential MWPDA algorithm at PN , one of the following two statements
must hold.
(1) rank(Pm, ∅) ≤ κm for all m ∈ M.
(2) rank(Pw, µ(w)) ≤ κm for all w ∈ W and for some (and hence, all) m ∈ M.
We distinguish the following two cases.
CASE 1: Suppose rank(Pm, ∅) ≤ κm for all m ∈ M.
Since rank(Pm, ∅) ≤ κm for all m ∈ M and µ is the outcome of the sequential MWPDA, it is easy to
verify that µ is the women-optimal stable matching at PN . By the definition of α(PN), there must exist
µ′ ∈ C(PN) such that α(µ
′, PN) = α(PN). Since µ is the women-optimal stable matching, we have rank(Pw,
µ(w)) ≤ rank(Pw, µ′(w)) ≤ α(PN) for all w ∈ W. Moreover, by Claim C.1 along with (C.3), we have
rank(Pm, µ(m)) ≤ α(PN) for all m ∈ M. Combining the facts that rank(Pm, µ(m)) ≤ α(PN) for all m ∈ M
and rank(Pw, µ(w)) ≤ α(PN) for all w ∈ W, we have α(µ, PN) ≤ α(PN). By the definition of α(PN), this
means α(µ, PN) = α(PN). So, µ is a minimum regret stable matching at PN . Because µ is the women-
optimal stable matching at PN , this implies that µ is women-optimal in the set of all minimum regret
stable matchings at PN .
CASE 2: Suppose rank(Pw, µ(w)) ≤ κm for all w ∈ W and for some (and hence, all) m ∈ M.
Since rank(Pw, µ(w)) ≤ κm for all w ∈ W and for some m ∈ M, it follows from (C.3) and the definition
of the sequential MWPDA algorithm that α(µ, PN) ≤ κm for all m ∈ M. This, together with Claim C.1,
implies that α(µ, PN) ≤ κm ≤ α(PN) for all m ∈ M. By the definition of α(PN), this means
α(µ, PN) = κm = α(PN) for all m ∈ M. (C.4)
By (C.4), we have α(µ, PN) = α(PN). So, µ is a minimum regret stable matching at PN .
Let µ′ be a minimum regret stable matching at PN . Clearly, rank(Pm, µ
′(m)) ≤ α(PN) for all m ∈ M.
This, together with (C.4), implies that rank(Pm, µ′(m)) ≤ κm for all m ∈ M. Furthermore, it follows from
the definition of the sequential MWPDA algorithm that µ is the outcome of the MWPDA algorithm with κ
at PN . Since κm ≥ rank(Pm, µM(m)) for all m ∈ M, µ is the outcome of the MWPDA algorithm with κ, and
µ′ is a stable matching with rank(Pm, µ′(m)) ≤ κm for all m ∈ M, by Lemma C.2, we have µ(w)Rwµ′(w)
for all w ∈ W. Since µ is a minimum regret stable matching at PN , this implies that µ is women-optimal
in the set of all minimum regret stable matchings at PN .
Since Case 1 and Case 2 are exhaustive, it follows that the outcome of the sequential MWPDA algo-
rithm is women-optimal in the set of all minimum regret stable matchings. This completes the proof of
Theorem 4.1. 
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Appendix D Proof of Theorem 5.1
The following lemma follows from Lemma 1 in Gale and Sotomayor (1985), which establishes a relation-
ship between two stable matchings at a preference profile.
Lemma D.1. Let PN be a preference profile and let µ, µ
′ ∈ C(PN). Then, µ(m)Rmµ
′(m) for all m ∈ M if and only
if µ′(w)Rwµ(w) for all w ∈ W.
Let us first recall some of the notations used in the context of the conditional MWPDA algorithm. For
a preference profile PN , a set of forced pairs Q1, and a set of forbidden pairs Q2, κ
r is the cut-off vector
associated with the MWPDA algorithm at Round r of the conditional MWPDA algorithm given (Q1, Q2)
and µ∗r is the outcome of the MWPDA algorithm at Round r.
Completion of the proof of Theorem 5.1. It is obvious that if the conditional MWPDA algorithm given
(Q1, Q2) converges at PN , then there exists a stable matching with forced pairs Q1 and forbidden pairs Q2.
We proceed to prove the rest of the theorem. Suppose there exists a stable matching with forced pairs Q1
and forbidden pairs Q2 at PN . Let C̄(PN) be the set of all stable matchings at PN with forced pairs Q1 and
forbidden pairs Q2. Clearly, C̄(PN) 6= ∅. Define the mapping µ
∗ : N → N ∪ {∅} such that
(i) for all m ∈ M, µ∗(m) = x if and only if there exists a µ ∈ C̄(PN) such that µ(m) = x and µ
′(m)Rmx
for all µ′ ∈ C̄(PN), and
(ii) for all w ∈ W, µ∗(w) = y if and only if there exists a µ ∈ C̄(PN) such that µ(w) = y and yRwµ
′(w)
for all µ′ ∈ C̄(PN).
It follows from the construction of µ∗ that it is women-optimal in C̄(PN) (see Knuth (1976) for details).
We show that the conditional MWPDA algorithm given (Q1, Q2) converges at PN producing µ
∗ as the
outcome.
If µ∗1 = µ
∗, then we are done. Suppose µ∗1 6= µ
∗.
Claim D.1. For all m ∈ M, we have




Proof of Claim D.1. By the definition of κ1, we have κ1m ≥ rank(Pm, µ
∗(m)) for all m ∈ M. Since µ∗ ∈
C(PN), by Remark 3.2, we have rank(Pm, µ
∗(m)) ≥ rank(Pm, µM(m)) for all m ∈ M. Combining the facts
that κ1m ≥ rank(Pm, µ
∗(m)) for all m ∈ M and rank(Pm, µ∗(m)) ≥ rank(Pm, µM(m)) for all m ∈ M, we have




m for all m ∈ M.
This proves (i) in Claim D.1.
By Lemma C.2, κ1m ≥ rank(Pm, µ
∗(m)) for all m ∈ M implies µ∗1(w)Rwµ
∗(w) for all w ∈ W. By Lemma
D.1, this implies µ∗(m)Rmµ∗1(m) for all m ∈ M. This proves (ii) in Claim D.1.
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
Claim D.2. µ∗1(m) = µ
∗(m) = w for all (m, w) ∈ Q1.
Proof of Claim D.2. Since κ1m = rank(Pm, w) for all (m, w) ∈ Q1, µ
∗(m) = w for all (m, w) ∈ Q1, by Claim
D.1, we have µ∗1(m) = w for all (m, w) ∈ Q1, which completes the proof of Claim D.2. 
By Claim D.2, it follows that the conditional MWPDA algorithm given (Q1, Q2) will not stop at Round
1, and because it does not converge either at Round 1, it will go to Round 2.
Claim D.3. κ2m ≥ rank(Pm, µ
∗(m)) for all m ∈ M.
Proof of Claim D.3. By the definition of κ2, we have κ2m = rank(Pm, µ
∗(m)) for all m ∈ Q1. Take m /∈ Q1.
If (m, µ∗1(m)) /∈ Q2, then by the definition of κ
2 and (ii) in Claim D.1, we have κ2m ≥ rank(Pm, µ
∗(m)).
On the other hand, if (m, µ∗1(m)) ∈ Q2, which in particular means µ
∗(m) 6= µ∗1(m), then by (ii) in Claim
D.1, it must be that µ∗(m)Pmµ∗1(m). Therefore, by the definition of κ
2 and (ii) in Claim D.1, we have
κ2m ≥ rank(Pm, µ
∗(m)). This completes the proof of Claim D.3. 













∗(m) = w for all (m, w) ∈ Q1. (D.1c)
Claim D.4. µ∗2(m)Rmµ
∗
1(m) for all m ∈ M and there exists m







Proof of Claim D.4. By the definition of κ2, (D.1a) implies µ∗2(m)Rmµ
∗
1(m) for all m /∈ M. Moreover, as
µ∗1 6= µ
∗, there must exist m′ /∈ Q1 such that (m
′, µ∗1(m
′)) ∈ Q2. This, together with the definition of κ2





By Claim D.4, (D.1a), and (D.1c), it follows that the conditional MWPDA algorithm given (Q1, Q2)
either converges at Round 2 or goes to Round 3. If it goes to Round 3, then using similar logic as for Claim
D.2, we have µ∗3(m) = µ










We argue that the conditional MWPDA algorithm given (Q1, Q2) must converge at some round.
20 Sup-
pose not. Then, we will get a sequence of stable matchings µ∗1 , µ
∗
2 , . . . such that µ
∗(m)Rm . . . Rmµ∗2(m)Rmµ
∗
1(m)
for all m ∈ M. Because µ∗1 , µ
∗
2 , . . . are all distinct and the number of stable matchings is finite, it follows
that there must be a round where µ∗ will be produced, and hence the conditional MWPDA algorithm will
converge.
20Recall that the conditional MWPDA algorithm always terminates, that is, either converges or STOPS at every preference
profile (see Subsection 5.1 for details).
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Now, we show that the outcome of the conditional MWPDA algorithm given (Q1, Q2) is always µ
∗. Let
r̃ be the terminal round of the conditional MWPDA algorithm given (Q1, Q2). Using similar logic as for
Claim D.1, we have µ∗(m)Rmµ∗r̃ (m) for all m ∈ M. Since µ




for all w ∈ W. Moreover, since the conditional MWPDA algorithm converges, it must be that µ∗r̃ ∈ C̄(PN).
Since µ∗r̃ ∈ C̄(PN) and µ
∗
r̃ (w)Rwµ
∗(w) for all w ∈ W, by the definition of µ∗, we have µ∗ = µ∗r̃ . This
completes the proof of Theorem 5.1. 
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